Adoption of new technology requires diversion of human and physical resources from direct production activities to learning/adjusting activities, which could reduce productivity temporarily. Focusing on the existence of such "learning cost", we derive a simple model on the optimal timing for technology upgrading. This model suggests that, other things being equal, a firm perceived to have better learning ability will show more frequent technology upgrading and higher market value even with possibly lower current profitability. The model predictions are supported by regression results from an unbalanced panel data set of more than 1,000 companies in the US during the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Simulations based on an extended model reproduce the negative correlation between investment growth and TFP growth commonly observed in the US and Japanese industry-level data. Based on the model predictions and empirical findings, this paper tries to explain the large swing in the stock market in the late 1990s as a rational response to new information affecting perceived learning cost for technology upgrading.
Introduction
In adopting a new technology, one must acquire a set of necessary skills and know-how in order to fully utilise the new technology and realise its maximum potential productivity gain. This will involve acquiring a basic and then advanced understanding of the technology as well as gaining experience with the application of the technology in a particular business/industry context. Therefore, it takes time and effort for the potential productivity of the new technology to be fully realised. Such 1 Division of Social Science, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong. The author is indebted to Rudiger Dornbusch, Jerry Hausman, Robert Solow, Jaume Ventura, and Alwyn Young for their advice. Special thanks go to Susanto Basu, John Fernald, John Haltiwanger, Boyan Jovanovic, and participants of "Productivity Growth and the Macroeconomy" workshop at the NBER 2001 Summer Institute for their useful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of the paper. All remaining errors are the author's own. resources spent in adopting a new technology should be considered as part of the cost for technology adoption. This paper will call it as "learning cost".
Consider, for example, technology upgrading from a typewriter to word processor. On the top of tangible costs for purchasing a personal computer, word processing software, a printer, floppy diskettes, etc., one will have to acquire the basic skills necessary to operate a personal computer. And yet, one will still have to become familiar with the word processing software. During the frustrating transition period, one might even lose a whole day's work simply by making a computer error. It is not surprising that such intangible learning costs could make one's productivity with the new word processor initially lower than that with the old typewriter.
The notion of learning cost is relevant at the organisation level as well. Consider a factory or a firm which has adopted a new technology. Just as with individual learning, it takes time and effort for an organisation to learn how to fully utilise a new technology and realise any productivity growth. For example, in order to most effectively implement a new technology, a new organisational structure might be called for. 2 Of course, restructuring an organisation requires tremendous time and effort. This restructuring can also be regarded as a part of organisational learning.
Recently, two "productivity puzzles" drew the attention of researchers in the Information Technology (IT) literature and in the studies of East Asian economic growth. The one was the slowdown in the US productivity growth during the 1980s in spite of the massive investment boom in IT capital.
3 The other was the unimpressive productivity growth from the impressive investment drive of "Newly Industrialising Economies" (NIEs) in East Asia. 4 These two cases seem to have interesting common aspects. In both cases, there was a massive investment in sectors related to more advanced technology, but the return on such investments was marginal in terms of productivity. This paper focuses on "learning cost" in technology upgrading as a potential explanation of these two "puzzles".
In the literature on technology and productivity, aggregate productivity slowdown is often attributed to required huge adjustment/learning costs in transition to a new technology regime. For example, David [1990] pointed out the case of pronounced productivity slowdown during electrification of the US and the UK over the period . According to his comparison of the introduction of dynamos and that of computers, contemporary observers in 1900 might well have said 2 For this point, see Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (1999) , amongst others. For example, see the beginning paragraph of Oliner and Sichel [1994] :
During the past 15 years, U.S. companies have poured billions of dollars into information technology. Yet, through the 1980s, many observers argue that these companies were not getting their money's worth. As hard as analysts scoured the numbers, they could not show that computing equipment contributed much to productivity growth, leading to Robert Solow's famous quip that "you can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics." that the electric dynamos were "everywhere but in the productivity statistics" like what Solow said about computers in 1987. Indeed, it took decades for large potential gains from factory electrification to be fully realised.
5 Greenwood and Yorukoglu [1997] offered a dynamic general equilibrium model based on the idea of vintage capital and investment in learning. Their model simulations supported their conclusion that "[a]t the dawn of an industrial revolution, the long-run advance in labor productivity temporarily pauses as economic agents undertake the (unmeasured) investment in information required to get new technologies operating closer to their full potential." 6 This paper offers a simple model of optimal timing for technology upgrading, which considers both tangible upgrading cost and intangible learning cost.
7 While most previous studies focused on macroeconomic implications of a large-scale technological change (namely, "technology revolution" or advent of a new "General Purpose Technology (GPT)"), this paper pays attention to implications of firm-level heterogeneity under continuous introduction of newer frontier technologies with higher potential productivity. While previous studies based on a dynamic general equilibrium model had to rely on simulations, a minimalist model in this paper is very simple, and hence, basic questions can be answered analytically without relying on numerical methods. A deterministic learning equation hired in this paper, as well as the assumption of perfect foresight, might look too simplistic. In fact, however, such problem is common in the main body of the existing literature. Predictions from models of deterministic learning process should be interpreted with special caution. In particular, the possibility of unsuccessful technology adoption cannot be easily incorporated in deterministic models or models with perfect foresight.
The overview of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. The model suggests that an optimising company with more frequent technology upgrading will tend to have higher market value even with lower current profitability. An empirical study using unbalanced panel data of more than 1,000 companies in the US from 1986 to 1995 supports this prediction (Section 3). Extending the scope from firm-level to industry-level, Section 4 estimates the magnitude of industry-5 More generalised version of David's insight from a historical perspective can be found in the notion of "General Purpose Technology (GPT)". Some technologies such as steam engine, electricity, railway, and microelectronics are regarded as GPTs in the sense that they are pervasively used as inputs by a wide and expanding range of sectors in the economy. In this approach, a technology revolution can be defined as the advent of a new GPT. See Bresnahan and Trajtenberg [1995] , Helpman and Trajtenberg [1996] , and Helpman and Rangel [1998] , for example.
6
Using simulations on a vintage capital model with conventional capital and information technology (IT) capital, Yorukoglu [1998] concluded that the marginal return of IT capital is underestimated by around 20% of its actual size. This conclusion is based on the simulation results that IT capital is associated with a strong learning-by-doing effect and that IT capital investment is mostly concentrated at the replacement dates. For a prototypical vintage capital model on the decision to replace old technologies with new ones, see Cooley, Greenwood, and Yorukoglu [1997] . According to back-of-the-envelope calculations by Jovanovic [1996] , the costs of adopting new technologies are 20 times as large as invention cost and may amount to 10% of GDP. In our model, technology adoption costs consist of two parts, namely, tangible upgrading cost and intangible learning cost.
8
Papers based on deterministic learning process includes Parente [1994] , Greenwood and Yorukoglu [1996] , Horstein and Krusell [1996] , and Yorukoglu [1998] . Klenow [1998] incorporated uncertainty in demand side, but the learning process remained deterministic. Jovanovic and Nyarko [1995, 1996] based on Bayesian learning belong to a rare exception.
wide learning-by-doing effects using annual data on 15 sub-industries in the Japanese machinery manufacturing sector from 1955 to 1990. The results show that industry-wide learning-by-doing was strong in low-tech industries where technological change was relatively slow, while it was insignificant in high-tech industries which experienced rapid technological changes. In Section 5, it is widely observed in the US and Japanese manufacturing industries that TFP growth tends to decrease with faster capital accumulation. This basic pattern is not affected by various methods for measuring capital stock, or varying levels of aggregation. This intriguing pattern can be explained by the idea of learning cost in installing technology-embodied new capital better than by other competing stories. To support this argument, Section 6 extends the basic model to incorporate capital and to take aggregation from the individual producer's level to the aggregated industry level. Simulations based on this extended model reproduce the observed negative correlation between the capital growth rate and the TFP growth rate. Section 7 discusses about model implications on the large swing in the stock market observed in the late 1990s, in comparison with implications from recent studies: (1) The IT revolution and the stock market (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1999; Hobjin and Jovanovic, 2001) ; and (2) IT investment and intangible assets, namely, organizational capital (Brynjolfsson et al., 2002; Atkeson and Kehoe, 2002) or "e-capital" (Hall 2000 (Hall , 2001b . Following the spirit of Hall [2001a] , this paper offers an explanation for the recent boom and bust in the stock market as a rational response to new information affecting perceived learning cost for technology upgrading. Section 8 concludes the paper.
[Section 2 -Section 7 are under revision.]
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